

CORRECTIONS

Please replace pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Minutes of the
3 August 1983 SECOM Meeting with the attached.

SECOM-M-270

3 August 1983

Minutes
Two Hundred and Sixty-sixth Meeting
Wednesday, 3 August 1983, 1100-1235 Hours
Room 4E-64, Langley Headquarters Building

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Chairman
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Robert C. Allen, Department of the Navy
Mr. James Callahan, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
Mr. Lloyd E. Dean, Federal Bureau of Investigation
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency
[redacted] National Security Agency
Col. Donald A. Press, Department of the Army
Mr. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice
Mr. Dennis E. Southern, Department of Treasury

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ALTERNATES PRESENT

Mr. Thomas H. Blankenship, Department of Energy
Mr. Edward Dansereau, Department of Treasury
Capt. William C. Horn, Department of the Navy
Mr. Anthony G. Mitchell, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Mr. Roger D. Smith, Department of the Air Force

ALSO PRESENT

[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] National Security Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] National Security Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] National Security Agency
Mr. Joseph L. Waggoner, Federal Bureau of Investigation
[redacted] Executive Secretary

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SECOM Staff

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Preliminary Comments

The Chairman:

A. Invited members' attention to the meeting beginning at 2:15, 3 August, on unauthorized disclosures. [] said the primary purpose of the meeting was to give Community Public Affairs Officers opportunity to hear Mr. Casey speak on his concerns about unauthorized disclosures and engage in a dialogue with him on their role in trying to control the problem. Following this discussion with the DCI, attendees would see the first presentation of a 15-minute videotape by Mr. Casey illustrating damage from leaks and advising of means by which the Community can help stop them. That in turn would be followed by an 8-minute, stand-up follow-on by [] and by a showing of videotape excerpts from a TV panel discussion on the press and government secrecy. The DCI's videotaped presentation and [] stand-up follow-on would be the package to be taken to the Community to alert senior officials to the scope of the problem and to enlist their help in combatting it. []

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B. Reported that on 25 July the DCI referred the proposed revision of DCID 1/14 to the National Foreign Intelligence Council for comments on the issue of whether investigative coverage should be reduced from 15 to 10 years. [] said he did not know when the NFIC would meet on this matter.

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C. Noted that members were sent copies of the revised FY 1985 SECOM budget request reflecting reduction in the guidance level and inputs from members and the subcommittees on high-priority projects. [] said he had not heard of any further developments on the FY 1985 budget. He noted that the appeal of the Senate Oversight Committee's recommended cut of our FY 1984 budget was still pending. []

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D. Advised that the SECOM staff, in consultation with the Computer Security Subcommittee, had prepared for Dr. Ruth Davis a set of preliminary comments on computer security matters that she should address and that SECOM should deal with through the subcommittee. [] said the paper stressed the need for a balanced approach in each of the several general areas of computer security initiatives; the need for adequate resources supported at the senior management level; and the need to attract, recruit, train and provide good career opportunities for Community personnel with expertise in this field. []

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E. Stated that, in accordance with NSDD-84, two nondisclosure forms, one for SCI and the other for collateral, have been developed. They have been sent to National Security Council members for approval, and should be ready for promulgation during August 1983. []

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F. Reported that all members had sent in their vote sheets on DIA's request for SECOM approval for DIA to release to the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University classified material bearing DCID 1/7 restrictive caveats. [] said a majority of members nonconcurred. He noted that several members questioned the need for this waiver, citing DIA's

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said a potential problem is that the Capitol Police might not want to let all of the 6 to 8 leave at the same time for their training. He advised that the [] schedule was such that they could not take them in small increments at different times. He said assistance by the Legislative Liaison Staff might be needed to resolve this concern and ensure that the Capitol Police would dedicate the officers to be trained to the performance of TSCM tasks as a primary duty. Mr. Dean advised that his conversation with Chief Powell and Captain Boyle indicated they were not disposed to let the whole group of officers leave for training at one time. [] said his understanding of the original oral agreement with the Capitol Police was that the Community would provide a single course for all who were to be trained. [] stressed the need to work out satisfactory arrangements with the Capitol Police on all aspects of their assumption of responsibility for TSCM on the Hill in order to avoid the Community losing confidence about these arrangements. Col. Press said the Secretary of the Army was concerned that Army participation in the training on the Hill could be misconstrued as giving the appearance of "bugging Congress." He advised that the Secretary would probably want Congressional leadership briefed to avoid this potential []

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[] reported that construction plans for [] expansion were going well. He said the 95% design review had been done in late July, and that the cost figure was solidifying at about \$400,000, plus \$56,000 for the architect and contract monitoring. He noted that they plan to close the school from November to January for construction. [] advised that in the last year or so there were three cases of ALTEC amplifiers carrying sensitive conversations out of hearing rooms in the Rayburn Building on the Hill. Mr. Rubino asked if the amplifiers had been examined to determine if they had been tampered with. [] said they hadn't, and cited lack of authority on the part of the Community to conduct such examinations. Mr. Rubino suggested we try to prompt the Congress to take action in such cases by advising them of specific problems in graphic terms. He and Mr. Dean agreed to discuss how best to handle this. Mr. Dean expressed his concern as to whether the Capitol Police are prepared at present to make the specific commitments needed for them to be able to do an adequate TSCM job. He suggested that if negotiations with them don't result in satisfactory commitments, the Community may need to continue indefinitely the practice of each agency providing its own TSCM coverage of sensitive testimony. [] said that was not an attractive alternative, as the old practice was not adequate and the Community could benefit from having a focal point on the Hill to deal with. [] asked [] to compile a list of actual and potential problems associated with TSCM on the Hill for use in briefing the DDCI and getting his guidance.

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E. Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations [] noted that SECOM members approved at the June meeting the concept of a short-term study of leaks; and that [] and others had offered to detail officers to conduct the study subject to development of an acceptable work plan. [] then briefed members on a work plan, proposed study methodology and a form designed to assist study personnel in capturing basic data relevant to the study. He said the study should begin in September, and he discussed questions which he hopes the study would answer. He advised that the results of the

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